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Abstract 
The deployment of CCS is facing numerous of challenges, some of which are related to the political and legal framework. In this paper we will 
deal with some of these challenges, and point out some suggested measures that may be initiated to improve the chances of deployment of CCS 
at scale. From our experience we have learnt that clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the involved parties in the CCS process are 
important aspects to succeed. Therefore, the distribution of such roles and responsibilities are major components in this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
With a rapidly growing energy demand, there seems to be common understanding that coal and other fossil fuels will play 
important roles for many years to come, regardless of efforts in deploying renewable energy production. However, as we all 
know the use of fossil fuels is not without consequences, as fossil fuels are the biggest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. 
Several countries, and e.g UN’s Climate Panel, Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change, the Global CCS Institute and the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) have identified Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) as a key mitigation technology to reduce 
these emissions. The IEA has further pointed out that delaying the deployment of CCS by ten years would imply a significant 
increase in the price for de-carbonization, as well as an equal significant loss of revenues for the power sector.  
Despite this international consensus of the importance of CCS, the number of large-scale integrated CCS projects in the world 
is decreasing, and several on-going projects struggle.  
There are many opinions on what issue is the most pressing in making CCS successful, and in which end of the CCS-chain 
(capture, transport and storage) to start. It has e.g. been argued that the most important issue to solve, and the place to start, is 
storage. Storage of CO2 probably represents that part of the CCS-chain that gives rise to the most complex issues and novel 
challenges. Looking at capture and transport one might say that the majority of issues have already been dealt with in traditional 
industries, and that much of the necessary legal framework therefore already is in place. Storage, on the other hand, creates issues 
like identifying suitable storage locations, deciding on long term liability, allocating long term storage costs and getting public 
acceptance.   
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Having been involved in several large scale CCS-projects, we have learnt from experience that there are different challenges 
relating to storage depending on which jurisdiction is discussed. E.g. in Finland, storage is not permitted, which makes 
transportation and cross-boundary related questions important to solve if one wishes to succeed with CCS. In Germany, on the 
other hand, storage is permitted, but onshore storage is the only option, which has – to put it mildly – created challenges related 
to public acceptance. 
In quite a few cases, we have also been trusted with the task of completing surveys of how existing legal framework applies to 
CCS, and what changes are necessary to have a comprehensive regulatory framework in place for all parts of the CCS-chain. 
Strangely enough, one challenge we have seen in this work is the resistance by stakeholders to accept that existing regulatory 
framework actually in many cases provides sufficient legal basis, both for authorities to grant licenses / permits and for industry 
to commit to activities and investment decisions. De-mystifying the need for legal framework has thus become an important part 
of our work, and with this article we hope to continue on that path.    
 
2. The stakeholders, roles and responsibilities 
2.1. Tripartite co-operation needed  
It is the responsibility of public authorities to put in place a predicable regulatory framework that enables industry to identify 
and carry out CCS-projects. If market conditions are not sufficient, public authorities need to assess whether to establish support 
or incentive schemes. Industry stakeholders fall into two rather different groups; technology suppliers and technology users. 
Development of CCS-technology fit for large scale projects needs a close collaboration between these two groups, where the joint 
interests in developing a.o. low-carbon production methods, materials and processes suitable for deployment in existing industrial 
plants as well as energy efficient capture technology should lead to different risk distribution and information sharing 
arrangements that the normal construction or technology licensing contracts provide for.  
Further, in our opinion, the authorities have the main responsibility to distribute information to the public about CCS, CCS 
projects and the need for them. However, the industry may as well take upon themselves to share information about their projects, 
to provide the public, the authorities and the wider industry with knowledge about the development.  
2.2. The importance of distributing responsibility 
In his report dated 17 September 2013 the Auditor General in Norway criticized the way the Norwegian Government were 
controlling the ownership role in the Norwegian CCS projects, both relating to actual performance and cost control. Further, 
challenges related to vaguely formulated emission permits, minimal financial consequences or penalties if the project were not 
finalized, no legal framework to regulate the long term liability for the stored CO2 and also the lack of a clearly stated CCS policy 
in Norway were also identified. 
As a result of the report and further the termination of the full-scale CCS project at Mongstad, the Storting's (Parliament) 
Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs held an extraordinary parliamentary hearing in January 2014. During 
the hearing Norway’s former Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, communicated that he was of the opinion that it was strictly 
necessary for the State to carry a substantial part of the costs and risks associated with this project, as it was the Norwegian 
Government that had initiated and wanted full-scale CCS, and because they were dealing with commercial actors. 
This Norwegian project is not unique. All over the world, projects close down due to lack of funding,*  lack of legal 
framework,† lack of public acceptance‡ and yet other reasons. However, the Norwegian project serves as a good example for the 
need of our assessment. Maybe the Prime Minister was right, at least if one considers the framework which formed the 
background for the project, and thus which incentives the commercial stakeholders had to initiate full-scale capture, transport and 
storage. To mitigate this situation, it is important to assess who is responsible for taking action, and who has the authority to 
make changes.  
The above illustrates that a prerequisite for the success of CCS is clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the involved 
parties.  
 
 
 
* Belchatów in Poland. See paragraph 2.3.1 for more information. 
† Taylorville Energy Center and the Trailblazer Energy Center. See paragraph 2.4.1 for more information 
‡ In Germany that was part of the problem, but not the cause for termination directly. 
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2.3. The role of the State 
To comply with the 2 oC limit, the states have several responsibilities in deployment of CCS. In our opinion, the two main 
responsibilities for the states are (1) to act as regulator and develop a regulatory framework that enables industry to pursue CCS-
projects, and (2) to engage in projects as provider of public support or as facilitator (or maybe as owner). As climate change is an 
international challenge and both the cost and complexity in mitigating climate change are tremendous, it is furthermore a duty for 
the governments around the world to cooperate and help each other deploying CCS. In our opinion, the problem may not be 
solved locally, even though local effort is essential to deploy the mitigating measures and to engage industry to participate.  
This is in line with what IEA has stated in its report, namely that “Clear political resolution, backed by suitable policies and 
financial frameworks, is needed to facilitate the necessary investment in low-carbon energy supply and in energy efficiency.”§  
2.3.1. Government participation and engagement 
State participation and engagement may show in different ways, like taking an active part as an investor and owner, as well as 
initiating assessment- and regulatory processes like in Alberta. However, before we can even discuss the different measures the 
states may implement or initiate as a part of their engagement, we need to look at the states’ policy making. It is decisive that 
states develop a clear and strong policy on climate change and mitigating actions, as this will both provide for tools for 
governments to implement mitigating actions, and might help increase public engagement. IEA has pointed out that the 
governments need to put in place incentive policies that support not only demonstration projects but also wider deployment. 
Projects have been halted and cancelled due to lack of State engagement. An example of this is the Belchatów project in 
Poland. The project was cancelled early 2013, primarily due to lack of funding, which amongst other things resulted from the 
project not getting the European Commission’s (EC) NER300 funding due to lack of commitment from the Polish Government.   
State engagement does not always have to involve ownership to the projects or even financing them. Australia serves as an 
example of a country that also does other things to engage in CCS and facilitate the industry’s engagement. The Australian 
Government has commenced a national project aiming at providing a pipeline and corridor database, which shall provide industry 
with access to CO2 infrastructure information. This will help investors assess whether there is available infrastructure before 
making an investment decision, and thus reduce risk in the projects. Further, state participation does not have to imply that 
projects have to be developed in each and every country at this stage. Maybe should the governments gather around a few 
projects to start with, to ensure success. As we will comment on under paragraph 2.4.3 this could be done through e.g. the Clean 
Development Mechanism.  
To help build up public confidence in CCS is a responsibility for both private parties and authorities worldwide, and to focus 
on projects that build up public confidence is important for the future of CCS.  
2.4. Regulatory framework  
2.4.1. The need of a CCS specific legal framework 
We are of the opinion that a predictable legal framework, both national and international, is necessary to deploy CCS. 
Because of both a wide range of individual and unique physical conditions and in each CCS project, it is important to have a 
flexible, but yet predictable, framework. The lack of this does represent a reason for delay in “early mover” projects. Legal 
framework shall remove unnecessary barriers, facilitate implementation and ensure that CCS is undertaken both safely and 
effective. Where CCS is used for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), the existing legal framework in most jurisdictions is adequate, 
insofar the jurisdictions have existing oil and gas operations. EOR will, therefore, not be discussed in further detail in this paper.  
One country that has taken this issue under serious consideration is Canada, and especially the province of Alberta, which 
initiated a process called the Regulatory Framework Assessment (RFA) in March 2011 and made several changes in the existing 
legal framework, to make sure necessary legal framework was in place before any full-scale CCS projects would start to operate. 
Other jurisdictions that have implemented a legal framework are the European Union (EU), the United States and Australia. The 
Directive 2009/31/EC was one of the first CCS specific legal frameworks in the world, and because of the number of countries 
subject to the EU regulation, the consequence of this directive is substantial.  
We have observed that countries where legal framework to handle CCS matters is not implemented, CCS projects halt. 
Examples may be found in US, Norway and Germany. In US, two Tenaska projects, connected to the Taylorville Energy Center 
and the Trailblazer Energy Center, were cancelled partly because of the lack of implementation of legislation, both federal and 
state.  In Germany the project Jänschwalde was halted as a direct consequence of the delay of CCS regulation and an adequate 
permitting regime.  
 
 
 International Energy Agency Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map. p. 13  
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The Norwegian full scale project at Mongstad was not cancelled as a direct consequence of lack of legal framework, but due 
to high costs. However, we are of the opinion that a predictable legal framework for CCS in Norway would have provided for 
incentives to steer the project to deployment, for both the Government and the private investors.  
Further, we are of the opinion that the jurisdictions that have implemented CCS specific legal framework and the jurisdictions 
that have started working on development and implementation of such framework should initiate a dialog aiming at producing a 
common legal framework. CCS specific legal framework may well be prepared through international law as e.g. a convention, 
with a responsibility resting on each state to implement the framework nationally. This way, the industry may benefit from a 
predictable and similar framework all over the world, the risk of carbon leakage might decrease and the non-OECD countries and 
others that have not yet started working on the legal framework may benefit from the experience of other jurisdictions.  
2.4.2. Licensing regime 
Any well-functioning regulatory regime for CCS should have a licensing regime. This may be assessed from two angles; (1) 
requirements to facilitate for CCS to obtain a license for the e.g. energy production, and (2) a requirement to obtain a license to 
engage in certain CCS activities. The former is known from e.g. the Directive 2009/31/EC on Geological Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide. The latter can be found in both CCS specific regulation and more general legislation. E.g. does the Directive 
2009/31/EC require exploration activities relating to storage site selection to be subject to a permit requirement in the Member 
States’ regulation, cf. Article 23. The same goes for operation of the storage sites, cf. Article 24. Similar requirements may also 
be found in countries with no CCS specific regulation, as in Norway.  
An important aspect of a licensing regime is that the approval process should be clear and predictable. It should be easy to 
identify for the investors when to apply for a permit, how to apply and which requirements the license may be subject to. The 
Government of Alberta focused on the application process during their RFA, and in our opinion their assessment comprised just 
as much tidying up existing framework, by e.g. defining roles and responsibilities, as producing new framework. 
Further, a licensing regime should be flexible. As CCS will be applicable to a wide range of industrial projects, e.g. cement or 
power production, and the physical conditions for storage may vary, e.g. onshore or offshore storage, the licensing regime needs 
to be flexible to be able to accommodate deployment of large scale CCS activities. The balance between clarity and flexibility is 
not always easy to find. However, as long as the flexibility is clearly stated, so the stakeholders know in which aspects of the 
license they could expect conditions to be imposed, and within what range of conditions the authorities have the flexibility to 
operate, the process is still predictable and to a large extent acceptable for the investor.  
If we were to promote one aspect of the licensing regime, other than predictability, flexibility and clarity, it would be third 
party access to CCS infrastructure. Third party access to infrastructure should be an important part of any licensing regime for 
CCS. The Directive 2009/31/EC states in whereas number 38 that “[a]ccess to CO2 transport networks and storage sites, 
irrespective of the geographical location of potential users within the Union, could become a condition for entry into or 
competitive operation within the internal electricity and heat market, depending on the relative prices of carbon and CCS.” This 
implies that the EU legal framework opens up for such third party access as a condition for the activities applied for. In our 
opinion, this option should be made mandatory, as far as technical and economically viable, both to reduce costs and to open up 
for a market within transportation and storage. Such third party access is also a requirement widely known in the oil and gas 
industry 
 
2.4.3. Liability regime 
One of the most crucial aspects of a legal framework for CCS is long liability. It is important for stakeholders to predict 
approximately the liability they might end up with before investing in a project, and an uncertain and open ended framework may 
result in a resistance to invest. We are of the opinion that the authorities need to be prepared to resume most of the responsibility 
for storage, both regarding the financial responsibility and the long term liability for the physical condition of the storage 
location. However, no matter how the distribution of liability is solved, it is important to create a clear and predictable 
framework for the entire CCS chain. The legal framework should therefore regulate both the liability for the CCS process and for 
potential leakage as well as post-closure responsibilities. 
For countries with no CCS specific legal framework liability for potential leakage from the CCS activities may already be 
comprised by pollution control act etc., as in Norway. However, the post-closure responsibilities and the transfer of liability from 
the commercial actors to the authorities are not provided for. This leaves, in principle, governments to impose whatever liability 
they find appropriate and adequate through the licensing regime, which makes the situation less predictable for the investors. 
Further, legal framework applicable for CCS might be spread over different legal frameworks, which might overlap. This makes 
the framework difficult to follow, especially for foreign investors. However, most modern legal frameworks do have both the 
flexibility and the authority to deal with liability issues for CCS. As we will describe in paragraph 2.5.1 below, these issues have 
been solved under international law for existing projects in Norway. The optimal solution would however be a CCS specific legal 
framework.  
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The long term liability, including the transfer of such liability, was also one of the concerns when Alberta made their RFA and 
updated their legal framework. The Alberta Government focused on clarifying the process, establishing performance criteria and 
financial security mechanisms, among other things. 
2.4.4. Financial mechanisms; carbon pricing, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) 
There are several financial mechanisms that could and should be implemented and further developed. First of all, it seems to 
be consensus on the importance of a carbon tax. In our opinion, there are two main elements for a carbon tax to be successful in 
reducing CO2 emissions, and thus eventually in promoting CCS; (1) the price should be high to create an incentive to look into 
other alternatives, and (2) the same price should apply globally to avoid carbon leakage.  
The system for buying and selling of carbon quota is one of the main measures in the climate policy, and both the price for 
quota and the size of the quota are important to reduce emissions. As per today this system does not serve as an effective 
measure, and both higher prices and closer collaboration between governments to reach a common global market are necessary.  
An increase in the price for emissions alone is not enough, but it represents a step in the right direction. To succeed, the cost of 
building and operating a CCS plant must be reduced so CCS represents the better and less expensive alternative. A part of this 
discussion is also financing of CCS projects. Here, we will comment on two alternatives; (1) a system of certificates not that 
different from what is done in the electricity market in e.g. Norway and Sweden, and (2) a mechanism called Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) that is meant to provide aid financing CCS projects in developing countries, in which experience rapid 
growth in need for fossil fuels.  
To have a certificate system financing CCS projects could be an effective mechanism to promote new CCS projects. By 
implementing a CCS certificate, the deployment of CCS could be regarded as a “Dutch treat”, in which e.g. producers of fossil 
fuels had a statutory duty to buy CCS certificates and where owners of CCS projects would receive a fixed number of certificates 
for every ton of CO2 captured and stored. The obligation to buy certificates will create a demand for certificates, which in turn 
may result in a functioning marked for CCS certificates. The whole idea must be to have a fund, preferably controlled by the 
authorities, from which payments are distributed to the eligible parties.  
As even many of OECD countries have found that they could not afford to invest in full-scale demonstration projects, how are 
we to expect that the non-OECD countries take part in the deployment of CCS? Both governments and NGO’s seem to agree on 
the fact that OECD countries must contribute financially so that developing countries may be able to commence CCS projects in 
relation to e.g. their power industry. This can be done through CDM, a mechanism which allows for countries with an obligation 
to reduce its emissions to implement an emission reduction project in a developing country. Not only will this contribute to 
emission reduction and employment in developing countries, but it will contribute to CCS projects actually being developed and 
an emission reduction globally. It is fair to assume that a CCS project in a developing country is less expensive than in an 
developed country, and countries that did not find the budget for full scale CCS projects in their own country will this way be 
able to contribute to more projects being commenced and thus that the technology development and cost reduction are pushed 
forward. 
2.4.5. State aid – public support 
 
Experience from numerous projects, from several jurisdictions around the world, shows that state aid is crucial to succeed 
with CCS. Although the financing is not the only challenge for CCS projects, it is important to find the optimal balance between 
state aid and the industry’s own investments, to secure both cost reduction and efficient performance of projects. There are of 
course different methods of providing state aid for CCS projects, besides the financial mechanisms provided for through legal 
framework. Examples of such state aid are support granted after an application from the industry, as financial support for e.g. 
R&D projects, or state aid announced and granted through a competition or procurement process, just to mention a couple of 
alternatives. 
Crucial elements of a system for state aid are: (1) clearly developed policies and guidelines for granting such aid, (2) that the 
aid is reserved in the government’s budget, and (3) that the budgeted aid is available through the entire project. If e.g. the aid 
granted over the budget is supposed to be given over more than one year, it is important that the aid continues automatically to 
next year’s budget, so that the applicant does not have to re-apply for the same aid all over again, risking that next year’s budget 
does not entail enough funds for the project. 
2.5. The role of the Industry 
In our opinion, the industry must be responsible of assessing the risks and impacts under the existing framework as part of its 
investment decision. Also, we believe that the industry must also contribute to the policy-makers, sharing knowledge, 
commenting on regulatory and policy proposals and providing advice regarding best available techniques and procedures. The 
industry must for example help the regulators develop framework for types and degree of monitoring for transitioning 
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progressively to increased CO2 storage using the infrastructure for EOR. Further, we believe that the industry may resume 
different roles and responsibilities depending on whether they are categorized as technology users or suppliers. 
 
2.5.1. Technology users  
In our opinion, the two main responsibilities for the users of the CCS technologies are to (1) identify and engage in projects, 
and (2) to demonstrate through investment decisions in demo-projects what is needed for large scale projects to be realized. The 
industry may not wait until all relevant framework and initiatives from the authorities are finalized, as the industry needs to work 
in collaboration with the authorities to develop the necessary framework to deploy CCS. 
The IEA has identified that many of the investment decisions taken are not in accordance with the world’s goal relating to the 
2oC limit or even resilient to the increased risks resulting from expected climate change. The responsible parties to these 
investments are both the industry and the authorities. 
The European Carbon Capture and Storage Demonstration Project Network (the Project Network) has found that European 
projects under development are facing challenges reaching investment decisions because of lack of incentives and defiance 
getting funding, resulting in a slow development for CCS in Europe. 
There is, however, a positive development in the US, Canada and China, with projects in the power sector reaching 
construction phase. One of these projects is the Boundary Dam Integrated Carbon Capture and Sequestration Demonstration 
Project in Canada, and in China a number of projects may reach an investment decision during 2014 or 2015. The Global CCS 
Institute has identified the projects in the US and Canada to be of global importance in the development of CCS. 
It is not uncommon that adequate incentives for projects and technology development, the policies needed and even the legal 
framework for the industry to commence new and environmental friendly business is developed in collaboration between 
authorities and industry. If the industry sees the need and opportunity for something, they may be able to influence the authorities 
to provide for incentives and the framework needed, by taking an active part in the public debate and by showing the authorities 
that the industry possesses initiatives and what it takes to handle the projects. An example of this is the “early movers” in the 
Project Network, which play an essential role in identifying barriers and providing input for development of a more streamlined 
CCS process on the way to commercialization. 
More concrete examples of the industry pushing through and creating CCS projects without a CCS specific framework to lean 
on are Sleipner and Snøhvit,** in which the Sleipner project has stored about 1 million tons of CO2 in the Norwegian continental 
shelf  annually from the start-up in 1996, and Snøhvit has been storing about 700.000 tons annually from 2008. These projects 
were not a result of initiatives from the Norwegian Government, nor a result of Statoil’s desire to contribute to mitigation of 
climate change, and at the time the projects were implemented there were no CCS specific legal framework in Norway. The 
projects were initiated as a result of the natural gas produced being too rich on CO2 compared to the market specification in the 
European gas market, and “incentivized” by the Norwegian CO2 tax. If Statoil wanted to sell their gas they had to strip the gas for 
superfluous CO2. The monitoring, which is an important part of any CCS specific legal framework implemented lately, and 
which is not mentioned in the Norwegian legal framework due to the lack of CCS specific legal framework, is performed in 
accordance with OSPAR and the London Protocol amendments relating to CO2 storage.  
The abovementioned projects demonstrate that the industry is capable to initiate projects even though political incentives and 
public funding are not part of the consideration. Further, the projects prove that the lack of CCS specific legal framework is not 
an absolute impediment.  
2.5.2. Technology suppliers 
For the suppliers, there are especially two issues which rest within their power to push forward; (1) development of safe and 
stable technology with the required capacity, and (2) cost reduction.  
The industry must provide the technology, and thus invest in R&D. We also find evidence for the industry’s own perception of 
their responsibility for technology development. The Project Network has expressed that “improving and refining capture 
technology remains a key goal for any CCS project”.†† Not only is it important for the industry to focus on R & D within its own 
organization to find new technology that works. In our opinion, the Project Network is on to something important by pointing out 
that refining the existing technology is a key goal. From our understanding, at least capture technology is generally well 
understood, and e.g. projects like Sleipner and Snøhvit demonstrate that the technology has been in use for a long time. The key 
to success regarding technology is to refine the existing technology, aiming at lowering the cost and improving the stability of the 
technology.  
 
 
** Part of the Project Network 
†† European Carbon Capture and storage network Demonstration Project network; Situation Report 2012. P. 31 
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It is further important for the industry to share information about projects, technology development, cost reductions etc. to 
enhance the chances of global success. It may also be necessary to cooperate with other industrial actors by participating in 
networks like the Project Network to an even greater extent than today, not only to share the knowledge gained in projects with 
other actors, but also maybe to collaborate on development of R & D projects to reduce risk and cost and at the same time 
increase the available resources in each project. The European Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage Laboratory Infrastructure 
(ECCSEL) may develop into such collaboration, if the industry decides to take part in the project, as it seems like ECCSEL aims 
at being a network for testing new technology for all the phases of CCS.   
Cost reductions are crucial for furthering the deployment of CCS. The cost reduction issue is a complex one. As the need for 
cost reduction is indisputable, it is also a fact that CCS is still in a learning phase, where costs are harder to control. However, 
before the costs are reduced, adding CCS to power production results in not only a drastic reduction in profit for the power 
companies, and thus a forced increase in the price for the consumers, but also it represent an impossible impediment for the 
deployment of CCS for numerous of non-OECD countries.   
It is important to focus on cost reductions for demonstration projects, to help create incentives and opportunities for CCS in 
the future. Both designing of  capture plants and retrofitting a capture unit to an existing plant, as well as the operational phase of 
CCS may imply significant costs, which the industry may be able to mitigate through careful planning and engineering. The cost 
reduction issue is also in the center of the discussion of public founding. The challenge is to determine the optimal funding to 
ensure deployment and at the same time create incentives for the industry to continue working on cost reductions. 
One factor that is crucial to reducing costs is implementing learning’s from individual large-scale projects into new projects. 
An interesting estimate made by SaskPower tells us that if the Boundary Dam were to be replicated, the capital cost would be 
reduced by maybe as much as 30 per cent. In our opinion, it is important that both private and public stakeholders continue to 
invest in new projects. One, two or three projects are not enough to reduce costs or to develop the most efficient technology. In 
comparison, there has been a lot of development since the first car left Ford’s factory.  
In relation to cost reduction in transportation, we agree with the Global CCS Institute, stating that third party access to 
infrastructure is an important contribution. This is a strategy that is already widely used within the petroleum industry, and which 
is an effective way to reduce both capital and operational cost, as well as risk for transportation.‡‡  
2.6. Other stakeholders  
Amongst the supporters of CCS there are a lot of NGO’s and educational institutions. Their responsibilities are perhaps more 
vague than for the two other groups of involved parties. They do not have the power to produce legislation or to decide what 
CCS policy is most appropriate or adequate for a country. On the other hand, the supporters will be able to influence the 
development of CCS by educating the public, which will contribute to public acceptance. Also, it is important to educate new 
scientists, engineers and others in CCS technologies, climate change and project management. Further will the supporters 
through participation in public hearings and debates be able to influence the politicians and others with the authority to push new 
changes through. 
One organization that is represented in almost any aspect of promoting CCS, is the Global CCS Institute established in 
Australia and which is represented in more than 40 countries. The Global CCS Institute is facilitating seminars and conferences, 
as well as managing the European CCS Demonstration Project Network, promotes and helps junior professionals in the industry, 
publishes reports, distributes news and publications on CCS and a lot more. There are also a lot of other organizations, both 
publicly and privately owned, taking responsibility for the deployment of CCS. These organizations are needed also in the future. 
3. Key Findings 
During our analysis of the framework for CCS we have made some interesting observations. To sum up our key findings we 
would like to emphasize that as long as there are commercial grounds for CCS, the existing framework for CCS is adequate, even 
though many jurisdictions lack CCS specific legal framework. Examples may be found both e.g. in Norway, c.f. Sleipner and 
Snøhvit, and in the US, c.f. numerous EOR projects. However, the comprehension of the lack of CCS specific regulatory 
framework, is that it represents an obstacle for deployment, due to the industry’s lack of confidence in the predictability and 
stability in the authorities’ decisions, and thus the projects. In our opinion, this comprehension might be mitigated by the 
authorities, both by providing information to the public on CCS and the application of the existing framework on CCS projects, 
but also by analyzing the existing framework and close potential gaps by adapting adequate changes to the framework. 
Where there are no commercial grounds for CCS, but rather the opposite, the lack of CCS specific framework and economic 
incentives represent serious obstacles for deployment. This situation, where CCS is imposed on the parties as part of required 
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emission reductions for power producers and other industrial actors, and where CCS mainly represents increased costs and 
reduced revenues of the projects, is more common. To mitigate the obstacles for CCS in this context, three things are needed; (1) 
increased carbon taxes, (2) a market for buying and selling CO2 quotas, and (3) implementation of CCS specific regulatory 
framework to provide the commercial actors both with adequate incentives and predictability. 
The development of CCS specific legal framework and financial mechanisms as mentioned above need to be initiated at a 
global level, with implementation at a national level. Only that way may the industry be forced to take an active part in 
deployment of large-scale CCS and carbon leakage be prevented. The industry’s participation is crucial to develop stable and 
predictable technology that works at the same time the costs are reduced to a level which makes commercial deployment 
possible. 
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